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ant's claims that the objects of perception are appear-
ances, "mere representations," and that we can never 
perceive things in themselves, seem to mark him as 
some sort of indirect realist. On the other hand, the 
theory of perception outlined in the Critique of Pure 
Reason is much closer to direct realism. As I will try to show, 
there are two criteria for direct realism, one epistemological and 
one ontological, and Kant’s theory strongly satisfies the former 
while partially satisfying the latter. Kant's transcendental ideal-
ism, under this view, necessarily makes him a sort of direct real-
ist, or as he put it, "empirical" realist.1 Two useful extremes in the 
philosophy of perception are the positions taken by Thomas Reid 
and the school of Scottish Common Sense on one hand, and by 
David Hume and the school of British Empiricism on the other. I 
will argue that Kant’s theory entails that we are directly, immedi-
ately aware of real external objects that, though they are the 
products of mental processes and therefore subject to "epistemic 
conditions,"2 do nonetheless occupy external space and are not 
simply mental entities. This theory matches the direct realism of 
Thomas Reid in important ways and eschews the skeptical phe-
nomenalism of Hume, the idealism of Berkeley, and the indirect 
realism of Locke (the last three of which rely on the notion that 
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the true objects of perception and thought are mental entities or 
states called “ideas” or “perceptions”). After outlining criteria in 
section I for a theory of direct realism, I will argue that Kant 
holds that we have direct perception of external objects that exist 
even when unperceived, and that his theory is remarkably simi-
lar to that of the most well-known direct realist in his lifetime, 
Thomas Reid. If these arguments succeed, then Kant should be 
regarded as some kind of direct realist. 
 
I. 
First, it should be made clearer what is meant by “direct real-
ism,” and by the above distinction between epistemological and 
ontological realism. Epistemological realism is here taken to be 
the claim that the objects of perception are actually things like 
books and chairs, rather than images that resemble them or other 
mental intermediaries that indicate or imply them. Ontological 
realism is the claim that physical objects like books and chairs 
exist mind-independently. Direct realism is the conjunction of 
these two claims. Locke’s representational realism would deny 
epistemological realism (instead claiming that we only perceive 
ideas in the mind) but affirm ontological realism. An idealist the-
ory might affirm epistemological realism but deny ontological 
realism. Thomas Reid’s direct realism would affirm both, and 
global skepticism would deny both. To figure out where Kant fits 
into all of this, we have to further distinguish two types of onto-
logical realism—the type that says these objects and their proper-
ties exist even when they are not perceived, and the type that 
says these objects exist independently of any facts about our 
minds. The second type of ontological realism is what Kant 
means by “transcendental realism.” Transcendental realism en-
compasses ontological realism, but goes further by excluding 
mental facts altogether. Kant, I argue, would affirm both episte-
mological realism and ontological realism, on the stipulation that 
ontological realism is not taken to mean transcendental realism. 
This distinction between ontological and transcendental real-
ism would not have been necessary before Kant’s argument that 
our forms of intuition and understanding shape the empirical 
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world. To say that a thing owes its existence to the fact that it 
conforms to our forms of intuition, and not whether it is in fact 
perceived, is the novel thesis that I will try to show Kant put 
forth in the Critique of Pure Reason. If this is an accurate reading of 
his theory, then extending the definition of ontological realism to 
exclude this thesis would be in part to redefine ontological real-
ism as “not what Kant believed.” It is more instructive to look at 
what the term would mean in the context of pre-Kantian philoso-
phy, and see where he seems to fit in.  
Before the Critique of Pure Reason, the preeminent alternatives 
to ontological realism were Berkeley’s immaterialism and 
Hume’s mitigated skepticism. Berkeley and Hume attacked the 
alleged independent existence of unperceived substances and the 
continued existence of an object even when it is not perceived—
in other words, the elements of Locke’s philosophy that made 
Locke an indirect realist rather than a mere idealist. If ontological 
realism is taken to be merely the claim that empirical objects exist 
with all their properties when unperceived, then Kant may in 
fact be an ontological realist. Given his desire to justify science 
and his commitment to “empirical realism,” his theory probably 
does not entail that the Andromeda galaxy is not there when no-
body is looking at the sky. Rather, for Kant, the Andromeda gal-
axy exists in virtue of its conformity to human forms of intuition 
and understanding. This means that although humans and their 
forms must exist in order for the Andromeda galaxy to exist, it 
does not, I argue, exist at time t in virtue of its being directly per-
ceived by some human at t (as an empirical idealist might say). 
The claim that he really was an ontological realist, however, has 
to be evaluated by looking at the text. In any case, we can distin-
guish between two kinds of direct realism: strong direct realism, 
the conjunction of epistemological and transcendental realism; 
and weak direct realism, the conjunction of epistemological and 
ontological realism. If Kant is both an ontological and epistemo-
logical realist, then he is a weak direct realist. What remains to be 
shown is what kind of realist he actually is. 
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II. 
The second of Kant’s Postulates of Empirical Thought in Gen-
eral is that “that which is bound up with the material conditions 
of experience, that is, with sensation, is actual.”3 This postulate 
could be seen as worryingly close to a denial of ontological real-
ism. Once we examine what he means by it, however, it is clear 
that it is transcendental realism, rather than ontological realism, 
that is excluded by it. 
The postulate bearing on the knowledge of things as actu-
al does not, indeed, demand immediate perception (and, 
therefore, sensation of which we are conscious) of the ob-
ject whose existence is to be known. What we do, howev-
er, require is the connection of the object with some actual 
perception, in accordance with the analogies of experi-
ence, which define all real connection in an experience in 
general.4 
 
The fact that a thing is actual does not depend on whether it is 
being perceived. This is a straightforward affirmation of ontolog-
ical realism and a denial of Berkeley’s motto, esse est percipi. It is 
necessary that there be some perception that leads us to suppose 
that the object exists—“the connection of the object with some 
actual perception”—but this is only to say that we must have 
some empirical justification for an empirical claim. The analogies 
alluded to are important here, and they are as follows: first, that 
substance is permanent amid changes;5 second, that every event 
adheres to the law of causality;6 and third, that substances in 
space stand in “thoroughgoing reciprocity”7 or “mutual interac-
tion.”8  
To say that our ascription of actuality to an unperceived ob-
ject must be connected to an actual perception in accordance 
with these analogies, therefore, is to say that we must (in princi-
ple) be able to infer its actuality from the causal connections of 
interacting substances, and that this inference must at some point 
be based on an actual perception. In other words, we do not actu-
ally have to perceive a thing in order to know that it exists, we 
merely have to perceive something that implies its existence ac-
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cording to basic laws, “the principles of...empirical connection.”9  
Kant gives the example of the perceived behavior of iron fil-
ings suggesting the existence of a “magnetic matter pervading all 
bodies, although the constitution of our organs cuts us off from 
all immediate perception of this medium.”10 Kant affirms the ac-
tuality of unperceived forces based on their being implied by 
previous perceptions; Berkeley, on the other hand, denies that 
such things (gravity, for instance) exist, because they are imper-
ceptible by nature.11 Furthermore, Kant says that it must be ad-
mitted, “that there may be inhabitants in the moon, although no 
one has ever perceived them.”12 It appears definitive that for 
Kant, an object’s existence in the empirical world does not de-
pend on its being actually perceived—that is, that Kant is an on-
tological realist. If Kant was an epistemological realist as well as 
an ontological one (i.e., a weak direct realist); then we should ex-
pect his theory to have important aspects in common with well-
known direct realist theories, which brings us to Thomas Reid. 
III. 
Kant's theory of perception, insofar as perception is to be de-
fined, is essentially identical to Reid's. Kant says in the B-
Deduction that perceptions are simply "representations accompa-
nied by sensation."13 Kant defines "representation" as the genus 
of mental acts under which sensations, concepts, and intuitions 
are classified.14 Since in the relevant cases intuition implies sensa-
tion, it would be redundant to say that intuition and sensation 
are necessary for perception.15 Furthermore, intuition must be 
synthesized under concepts in order to yield a perceptible repre-
sentation (more on this later); so it must be conception, rather 
than intuition, that combines with sensation to constitute percep-
tion. I therefore take representation in this context to mean the 
conception of a thing, and so perception of x is, for Kant, the rep-
resentation or conception of x coupled with and initiated by a 
present sensation. Reid often refers to "that conception and belief 
of the external object, which we call perception.”16 There seems 
to be a difference here, namely that Reid puts belief in the role 
that sensation fills for Kant. However, it can be shown that Reid's 
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account of perception also reduces to conception and sensation.  
There are, for Reid, three necessary elements of perception of 
x: the conception of x, the belief in the present existence of x, and 
the condition that said belief is immediate and non-inferential.  It 
is clear for Reid that mere conception of x does not entail the be-
lief in the existence of x. He and Kant are in complete agreement 
on this point: "In the mere concept of a thing no mark of its exist-
ence is to be found."17 Reid's "faculty" of conception 
is not employed solely about things which have existence. I can 
conceive a winged horse or a centaur, as easily and as dis-
tinctly as I can conceive a man whom I have seen. Nor 
does this distinct conception incline my judgment in the 
least to the belief, that a winged horse or a centaur ever 
existed.18 
 
The belief in the legitimacy of the conception (i.e., the exist-
ence of the thing conceived) cannot, therefore, come from the 
concept itself, but must find its origin elsewhere. Reid also says 
that "we perceive no object, unless some impression is made up-
on the organs of sense."19 Since perception is defined above as the 
combination of conception and belief, and since sensation of x is 
the only other necessary condition for perception of x, and finally 
since belief cannot come from conception, then belief in x's exist-
ence must come from sensation. We see as a result that Reid's 
theory holds that perception is the combination of conception 
and sensation. This definition is identical to Kant's. Therefore, at 
least in terms of what is meant by the word perception, there is 
no daylight between Kant and Reid. 
Kant argues in the Analytic of Concepts that concepts are 
necessary for all perceptual experience. This conclusion is due to 
several assumptions on Kant’s part, chief of which is the idea 
that experience is a kind of judgment or knowledge, specifically 
of the empirical kind.20 The necessary conditions for judgments 
in general should therefore be part of the conditions for experi-
ence as well. According to Kant, “all judgments are functions of 
unity among our representations.”21 Allison explains that for 
Kant, the “unification of representations in a judgment, which 
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provides a determinate content for thought, occurs by bringing 
these representations under a concept.”22 When we make a judg-
ment of the form “A is B,” we do not simply consider A and con-
sider B, we synthesize the two concepts into a unified judgment. 
According to Kant, this synthetic unity can only be achieved by 
means of concepts, which function as the necessary rules accord-
ing to which such synthesis proceeds.23 Furthermore, “the same 
function which gives unity to the various representations in a 
judgment also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various repre-
sentations in an intuition.”24 Acts of conception are therefore nec-
essary to unify the synthetic judgments of perception and relate 
them to an object. For Reid, conception is also necessary for the 
judgments (i.e., beliefs) that constitute perception: “there can be 
no belief without conception.”25 
This congruence is a significant point of overlap. We can im-
agine a spectrum of perceptual theory with Reid and his two-
part theory (i.e., sensation and conception) at one end and Hume 
and Berkeley with their sensory-input-only theory at the other. 
Reid believes that sensation alone presents us with no objects, 
and that acts of conception are required to give us an external 
object rather than mere blind feeling, as sensation “has no object 
distinct from itself.”26 Kant falls squarely with Reid in his ac-
count of the necessary and sufficient elements of perception. 
Kant, like Reid, has no need for the veil of perception, because, 
unlike Reid, he believes that the transcendental ideality of space 
and time eliminates certain problems that are posed by the as-
sumption that things in themselves exist spatiotemporally inde-
pendently of our epistemic conditions. Kant believes, in fact, that 
one must choose between empirical realism and transcendental 
realism. 
Kant writes that Berkeleyan or empirical "idealism is una-
voidable, if space be interpreted as a property that must belong 
to things in themselves."27 When space is said to have “objective 
reality,” we are confronted with absurdity, “in that two infinite 
things, which are not substances, nor...inhering in substances, 
must yet have existence...and moreover must continue to exist, 
even although all existing things be removed[.]”28 Thus, Kant 
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argues, if we ascribe transcendental reality to space and time, the 
concept of matter becomes absurd, and “we cannot blame the 
good Berkeley for degrading bodies to mere illusion.”29 This 
“degrading [of] bodies to mere illusion” is empirical idealism in 
a nutshell. Kant contrasts his own theory with Berkeley’s, and 
claims that, “I am not saying that bodies merely seem to be out-
side me...[and it] would be my own fault, if out of that which I 
ought to reckon as appearance, I made mere illusion.”30 Later on, 
Kant says that it would be “unjust” to call his theory empirical 
idealism, “which, while it admits the genuine reality of space, 
denies the existence of the extended beings in it.”31 Transcenden-
tal idealism, “on the contrary, admits the reality of the objects of 
outer intuition…[f]or since space is a form of that intuition which 
we entitle outer, and since without objects in space there would 
be no empirical representation whatsoever, we can and must re-
gard the extended beings in it as real.”32 Thus it is false to say 
that Kant thinks that outer existence is a “mere illusion,” because 
insofar as things are empirical objects, they really do have the 
spatiotemporal qualities they seem to have.  
A possible objection to this direct realist reading of the 
"conception plus sensation" definition could be that all this tells 
us is that these concepts are what we perceive, and sensation 
merely gives us an especially lifelike version of the concept. This 
account would shift Kant's position closer to Hume’s. Kant's con-
cepts and the schemata that underlie them, however, are not im-
ages (as this objection suggests), but rules of thought. 
No image could ever be adequate to the concept of a tri-
angle in general. It would never attain that universality of 
the concept which renders it valid of all triangles, wheth-
er right-angled, obtuse-angled, or acute-angled... The con-
cept 'dog' signifies a rule[.]33 
 
Concepts are not the typical objects of perception or of thought 
because they partially constitute the acts of both perception and 
thought (though in philosophical contexts we may think about 
concepts). The categories "think objects in general, without re-
gard to the special mode (the sensibility) in which they may be 
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given[.]"34 It is not the concepts that are intuited through sensibil-
ity, but the objects that they think. The objects that the concepts 
are about are directly "given" in perception; again, Kant shares 
Reid's view. 
 
IV. 
This similarity between Reid and Kant comes in part from 
their denials of the continuum of vivacity between impressions 
and ideas. While this terminology is undeniably Humean, the 
same doctrine goes back to Locke and appears in nearly identical 
form in Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge, along with the 
principle that mental ideas are copied from ideas of sense that 
are "imprinted" on the body.35 This notion of conception being a 
faded or enervated form of sensation is summarily rejected by 
Reid and Kant, who view the two as separate faculties that yield 
different information and must be combined in perception. Both 
thinkers saw a clear break where the so-called British Empiricists 
saw a continuum. This distinction between sensation and con-
ception, and the doctrine that both faculties are necessary for 
perception, is one of Kant's great breakthroughs in philosophy; 
yet the similarity of Reid's and Kant's accounts of perception out-
lined above shows that Reid had already made a more rudimen-
tary version of this logical distinction (and yet necessary cou-
pling) while Kant was still in his "pre-Critical" period.36 
Another spectrum we might call to mind is that between the 
empiricist, who in Kant's view wants to reduce knowledge and 
concepts to sensory experience, and the rationalist, who (again in 
Kant's view) wants to elevate sensory experience to the level of 
concepts and the intellect. Kant clearly views the history of phi-
losophy in this way and famously describes Leibniz, the consum-
mate rationalist, as having "intellectualised appearances, just as 
Locke, according to his system of noogony...sensualised all con-
cepts of the understanding, i.e. interpreted them as nothing more 
than empirical or abstracted concepts of reflection."37 On this 
spectrum, Reid and Kant again occupy proximate positions, 
though this time they are in the middle rather than at one end. 
Kant's "middle path" in the theory of knowledge, namely that an 
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innate intellectual organization (rationalism) combines with con-
tingent sensory experience (empiricism) to produce knowledge, 
has already been chipped at, if not completely "cut," by Reid. 
Reid denies Hume's claim that any concept must have a corre-
sponding impression which resembles it; for the sensations you 
get from the hardness and extension of an object are as different 
from those qualities themselves "as pain is to the point of a 
sword."38 
In other words, according to Reid, it is false to claim from the 
constant conjunction of (for example) the sensation of hardness 
with the primary quality of hardness that there is an equivalence 
or resemblance between that quality and our sensation of it. Reid 
points out (following Berkeley) that there is no way that a feeling 
can resemble a quality such as hardness, and therefore that the 
concept of hardness is not simply abstracted from the sensation, 
but rather that our minds are constituted in such a way that we 
understand (noninferentially) that the sensation of hardness 
comes about because of the primary quality.39 Concepts, under 
Reid's system, are only given to us through sense experience, but 
we could not have them if we were not born fluent in the lan-
guage of nature, to use his analogy.40 The sensation functions as 
a sign of the quality. Just as the word "hardness" leads to the con-
ception of the quality of hardness, the sensation we experience 
when we touch a hard thing naturally suggests to us the quality 
of hardness in the felt object.41 The concept of hardness, there-
fore, doesn't enter the mind until it holds the corresponding but 
non-resembling sensation; your mind reads this natural sign, and 
this causes your perception (conception and belief) of hardness 
as a primary quality of the object.42 Kant’s pure concepts, on the 
other hand, are in the understanding prior to all experience.43 
Nevertheless, Reid and Kant are more similar to each other on 
this issue than either is to Locke or to Leibniz because Reid and 
Kant hold that the natural organization of the mind combined 
with sensory experience is what allows us to consciously possess 
concepts and to perceive objects through the application of those 
concepts.  
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V. 
Comparisons with Reid aside, a central reason for my asser-
tion that Kant is an epistemological realist is that Kant does not 
say that perception of x entails that we perceive any intermediat-
ing entities, insofar as x is an empirically real object. The 
“Refutation of Idealism” is a short but extremely important sec-
tion added to the CPR in the second edition. Kant sought to re-
fute the idea that we are first conscious of our own inner states 
and then must infer the existence of outer objects. The fault of 
Berkeley, Descartes, et al., is that they “assumed that the only 
immediate experience is inner experience, and that from it we 
can only infer outer things.”44 If he were an indirect realist, how-
ever, he would defend this idea. He argues that we do not per-
ceive our representations and then refer them to an object, but 
that we directly perceive the outer objects: “Thus perception of 
this permanent is possible only through a thing outside me and 
not through the mere representation of a thing outside me.”45 The 
representation is not some inner mediating mental entity like a 
Lockean/Cartesian idea, but rather it is the state of referral of 
sensation to the outer object, the intentional act by which we are 
presented immediately with such outer objects. The concept of 
“referral” comes from the Transcendental Aesthetic, where Kant 
argues for the ideality of space by saying that it must be presup-
posed “in order that certain sensations be referred to something 
outside me.”46 Representation, then, is precisely this referral of 
the sensation to the outer object, and it is not the act or inner 
state of referring (i.e., the representation) that is the object of our 
perception, but rather the external object to which the sensation 
is referred—in other words, “outer experience is really immedi-
ate.”47 Self-consciousness of the Cartesian sort is in fact mediated 
by outer perception, not the other way around (as indirect real-
ism might have it), and the “determination of my existence in 
time is possible only through the existence of actual things which 
I perceive outside me.”48 
The claims that “outer experience is really immediate”—
when “outer experience” means experience of outer objects with 
rich spatial qualities such as being “outside me” and “outside 
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and alongside [other objects]”—and that objects are “actual 
things which I perceive outside me” are unambiguous expres-
sions of epistemological realism. Kant’s theory of perception thus 
fulfills our criteria for weak direct realism in that the objects of 
perception are “outer” in a rich, three-dimensional sense, and in 
that these objects are “permanent,” as they persist, independent-
ly, even when not perceived. As he claims that we immediately 
and non-inferentially perceive actual objects in space, it is fair to 
call him a weak direct realist. Furthermore, we might expect that 
a weak direct realist would share salient features of his theory of 
perception with the theories of other direct realists, and the dis-
cussion of Thomas Reid, perhaps the predominant (strong) direct 
realist in early modern philosophy, shows this to be the case. 
While Kant famously asserts that we have no knowledge of 
things in themselves—a position that would likely get Reid's 
teeth grinding—this is only so far as they are non-spatiotemporal 
noumena, the unknowable unconditioned. Once our mental 
forms of perception have synthesized a sensible object, we in-
deed have direct access to it, though the synthesis itself is a 
“blind…function of the soul…of which we are scarcely ever con-
scious.”49 Despite the hiddenness of the means by which we rep-
resent objects, the process yields an object of which we are direct-
ly aware. “All outer perception...yields immediate proof of some-
thing real in space, or rather is the real itself. In this sense empiri-
cal realism is beyond question.”50  
Sensible objects are themselves "mere representations," but 
they are three-dimensional and “outside me,”51 and we have di-
rect epistemological access to them. As Allison notes, Kant's use 
of the term representation in this context has led to the "standard 
picture" that his transcendental idealism results in some form of 
empirical idealism or representationalism.52 According to Kant, 
perception is nothing but conception and sensation, and there is 
no intermingling "idea," as Locke would have us believe. In other 
words, we do not see a tree by means of seeing something else; 
we directly perceive a tree, through our conception of "a tree" 
accompanied by a visual "sensation" that indicates to us that this 
conception is of a presently existing object. For Kant, the objects 
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of perception are empirically real outer objects, and owe their 
existence not to the fact that a person is looking at them at a par-
ticular time, but rather to the fact that they conform to our forms 
of intuition and therefore could possibly be the object of a per-
son’s experience. In contrast to the idealist who asserts that ob-
jects exist only insofar as they are perceived, Kant’s theory en-
tails that objects exist insofar as they are objects capable of being 
perceived, or as he puts it, “objects of possible experience.”53 And 
this capability, which constitutes their status as "mere representa-
tions," refers not to any mental entities of perception, but to the 
way we perceive external objects, and therefore to the epistemic 
conditions (i.e., forms of intuition and understanding) that dis-
tinguish Kant's transcendental idealism from the "dogmatic ide-
alism of Berkeley" and the "problematic idealism of Descartes."54 
In the end, empirical objects, as spatiotemporal and catego-
rized phenomena, are "given" directly to us through intuition. It 
appears that the appeal of viewing Kantian phenomena through 
an idealist notion of "representations," though seductive, is su-
perficial and inconsistent with how Kant describes the process of 
perception. The outer objects themselves, not the representations 
or conceptions of them, are given to us in experience. It is clear 
from the above that Kant and Reid share fundamental views on 
epistemology and perception. If the structural similarities be-
tween Reid and Kant really exist and have the significance I’ve 
attached to them; if this account of the direct "givenness" and 
permanence of empirical objects is accepted as an accurate read-
ing of the text; and if my definitions of and distinctions between 
different kinds of realism are correct, then it must be accepted 
that Kant was a weak direct realist. 
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Notes 
 
1 CPR, A28/B44 
2 This term is taken from Allison 1983. 
3 CPR, A218/B266 
4 CPR, A225/B272 
5 CPR, B224 
6 CPR, B232 
7 CPR, B256 
8 CPR, A211 
9 CPR, A225/B273 
10 CPR, A226/B273  
11 The denial of gravity is found in the first of the Three Dialogues. 
Berkeley, 29  
12 CPR, A493/B521 
13 CPR, B147 
14 CPR, A320/B376 
15 Pure intuition might qualify as a case of intuition without sen-
sation, but that exception is not relevant here, where the issue is 
empirical perception. 
16 EIP, 212 
17 CPR, A225/B272 
18 EIP, 267 
19 EIP, 36. See also: IHM, 44  
20 CPR, B147: “empirical knowledge…is what we entitle experi-
ence.” B166: “But empirical knowledge is experience.” 
21 CPR, A69/B93 
22 Allison, 116 
23 CPR, A105-6 
24 CPR, A79/B105 
25 EIP, 172 
26 EIP, 133 
27 CPR, B274 
28 CPR, B70-1 
29 CPR, B71 
30 CPR, B69 
31 CPR, A491/B519 
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32 CPR, A491-2/B520 
33 CPR, A141/B180 
34 CPR, A254/B310 
35 The relevant passage is found in Sec. 33 of Berkeley’s Principles. 
Berkeley, 37 
36 I have so far only quoted from Reid's EIP, which was pub-
lished in 1785, after the first edition of Kant’s CPR (which was 
published in 1781), but the point about sensory impressions and 
the concepts we gain from them being different entities entirely 
(and thus not simply more or less forceful versions of each other) 
is argued strongly and repeatedly in Reid's 1764 IHM (especially 
in Ch. 5, "Of Touch") and is central to the critique of empiricist 
idea doctrine in that work. 
37 CPR, A271/B327 
38 IHM, 60 
39 Ibid. 
40 IHM, 59, 85 
41 IHM, 57-8 
42 IHM, 64-5 
43 CPR, A65-6/B90 
44 CPR, B276 
45 CPR, B275 
46 CPR, A23/B38 
47 CPR, B276 
48 CPR, B275-6 
49 CPR, A78/B1-3 
50 CPR, A375 
51 CPR, A23/B38 
52 Allison, 26-27 
53 CPR, B148 
54 CPR, A226/B274  
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